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Abstract
Th i s   p a p e r   a n a l y s e s   c u r r e n t   a n d   a l t e r n a t i v e   a f f o r e s t a t i o n   p o l i c y   i n s t r u me n t s   i n   F l a n d e r s .  
F i r s t   we   s e l e c t   f o r e s t   s i t e s   t h a t   ma x i mi z e   n e t   s o c i a l   b e n e f i t s   g i v e n   a   c o n s t r a i n t   o n   t h e   t o t a l  
a r e a  o f  n e w f o r e s t s  a n d  t h e n  we  s e l e c t  p o l i c y  i n s t r u me n t s  t h a t  y i e l d  t h i s  o p t i ma l  
c o mb i n a t i o n   o f   s i t e s .   F o r   e a c h   p o l i c y   o p t i o n ,   we   c a l c u l a t e   t h e   a s s o c i a t e d   c o s t s   f o r  
l a n d o wn e r s   a n d   g o v e r n me n t   a s   we l l   a s   n e t   s o c i a l   b e n e f i t s   f o r   s o c i e t y .   Ou r   e mp i r i c a l  
i l l u s t r a t i o n   s h o ws   t h a t   t h e   we l f a r e   g a i n   i s   c o n s i d e r a b l e   i f   t h e   a f f o r e s t a t i o n   s u b s i d y   i s  
c o n d i t i o n e d   o n   a n   o b j e c t i v e   c r i t e r i o n   r a t h e r   t h a n   a   c a s e - b y - c a s e   a p p r o a c h .   Ou r   r e s u l t s   a l s o  
s h o w  t h a t   i t   i s   wo r t h wh i l e   t o   c o n s i d e r   a l t e r n a t i v e   p o l i c y   i n s t r u me n t s ,   s u c h   a s   a u c t i o n s ,   n o t  
p r e v i o u s l y   u s e d   i n   Be l g i a n   l e g i s l a t i o n .  
Ke y wo rd s:   Af f o r e s t a t i o n   /   p o l i c y   i n s t r u me n t s   /   o p t i ma l   l o c a t i o n    2
1. Introduction 
Stimulating afforestation is one of the challenges of environmental policy in Flanders as in 
many other countries. I n order to optimally design the afforestation policy, it is important 
to  carefully  consider  the  location  of  the  newly  created  forests.  Through  a  heuristic 
approach we analyse how to select the forest sites that maximize net social benefits given 
a constraint on the total area of new forests. These net social benefits include timber yield, 
hunting, ecosystem, recreation and non-use values minus planting and management costs 
and  opportunity  costs  of  foregone  agricultural  production.  They  are  the  result  of 
subtracting all relevant costs from all relevant benefits for all affected parties in Flanders 
( OECD, 20 0 6 ) . This is in our opinion a crucial step that is missing in the current Flemish 
afforestation policy, which implicitly assumes that any forest is a desirable forest. I t is, 
however, clear that not all forests have the same per hectare value. Depending on its size 
and type as well as the distance to other forests and city centres, the increase in welfare 
brought  about  by  the  new  forest  can  differ  greatly.  This  paper  analyses  current  and 
alternative afforestation policy instruments in view of the 10 .0 0 0  ha afforestation goal of 
the Flemish government.  
The current afforestation policy is based on three pillars: the acq uisition of land by the 
Flemish government, the acq uisition of land by local authorities, and subsidies for private 
landowners. However, this policy is not likely to yield the optimal location of the new 
forests and thus the highest social value for several reasons. Firstly, the government only 
buys less productive ( farm) land or land that becomes available on the market, e.g. because 
of the retirement of its owner. Secondly, subsidies are available for all landowners who 
meet the req uirements and, therefore, the regulator cannot predict who will use them. 
Locational aspects seem to be of minor importance. This implies that one already fairly 
wooded region could potentially increase its forest cover to a much larger extent than 3
scarcely wooded areas, such as highly urbanized areas with a high need for recreation 
opportunities. This could also imply the creation of multiple small forests of each only a 
few hectares and thus less valuable from both an ecological and a recreational point of 
view. Finally, the policy is likely to be expensive for the government.  
Since the optimality of the current policy is questionable, we suggest alternative policies 
and test these in a real life example. In our opinion, a first essential step in improving the 
Flemish afforestation policy is the selection of the optimal location of a set of new forests. 
The emphasis lies on the optimal spatial allocation of these new forests from a benefit-cost 
perspective given the area constraint that cannot be met by creating one single new forest. 
We also include the negative externalities associated with the manure deposition policy 
when farmland is used for spreading manure by other farmers.  
Once the optimal location of new forests is found, we investigate several different policy 
scenarios and check whether they can yield this optimal location. We also calculate the 
associated costs for landowners and government as well as net social benefits for society. 
Our results allow us to formulate policy recommendations and show that it is worthwhile 
to consider alternative policy instruments not previously used in Belgian legislation. For 
example,  auctions  for  afforestation  projects  can  be  used  to  decrease  the  costs  for  the 
government associated with a subsidy system. 
In section two we describe the current afforestation policy in Flanders. In section three we 
model  land  use  decisions.  Section  four  describes  methodological  issues  regarding  the 
selection of forest sites and the selection of an efficient policy instrument. Section five 
provides an overview of the data. In section six we present and discuss the results for the 
different policy options and compare them to the optimal and the current situation with a 
realistic example. 4
2. Current afforestation policy 
The Flemish region is characterized by low forest cover (<  10% of the land area) and a 
high population density index (approximately 400 inhabitants per km² ). In Flanders, the 
Long-Term Regional Forest Plan
1 (LTRFP) assumes a forest cover of 12% by the year 
2010 (ABG, 2003). This target is very ambitious and unlikely to be met in time. The Land 
use Structure Plan of Flanders
2 (LSP) has identified the policy options for the realization 
of new forests or forest extensions of 10.000 ha by 2007 . The Flemish Government is 
assumed  to  take  a  leading  role  in  the  realization  of  this  afforestation  goal  but  local 
administrations and the private sector have responsibilities as well. In this paper, we only 
discuss subsidy schemes for private landowners, in particular farmers, and the purchasing 
policy of the Flemish government. 
Since the 10.000 ha goal was set, approx. 206 ha of new forests have been created per year 
while 126 ha of existing forest has been deforested each year (NARA, 2005 ). This implies 
that at the current rate it will take the government 127  years to reach the policy target.  
The LSP does not give any guidelines as to the exact location of the new forests. On the 
qualitative level, the LSP indicates that ecological forest extension should primarily be 
realized  close  to  existing  forests,  as  a  buffer  (e.g.  between  a  residential  area  and  an 
industry zone), or in view of nature development or proximity of urban areas in order to 
serve as many potential recreationists as possible
3.
                                                     
1 The Long-Term Regional Forestry Plan is a sectorial plan, in which the basic framework of the regional 
afforestation policy is identified for the future. 
2 The Land use Structure Plan of Flanders (19 9 7 ) allows the Flemish Government to plan sustainable land 
use for the next decade. Its main goals are to improve the general quality of life in urbanized areas and to 
strengthen the open space structures.  
3 The plan assumes that   emphasizing recreation   1 ha of woodland is needed per 100 inhabitants. 5
2.1 Subsidy schemes for farmers 
In order to implement European directives, the Flemish government worked out a subsidy 
scheme for the afforestation of farmland
4. Within the framework of the EU Regulation 
1257/99 on the support for rural development, support may be granted to private persons 
or administrations. More details on the European forest policy can be found in, among 
others, Bendz (2004) and Pü lzl (2005). 
The conditions that need to be fulfilled for a Flemish farmer to apply for a subsidy are: 
- the parcel should be exploited as farmland in the 5 years prior to the application  
- at least 0.5 ha of farmland should be forested 
- no deforestation of multifunctional forests for at least 25 years;  afterwards the land can 
only be deforested within the terms of the Forest Decree (Bosdecreet of 13 J une 1990) 
- plantings of poplar should remain for at least 15 years;  afterwards the land can be re-
used for farming unconditionally. 
A  summary  of  afforestation  subsidies  for  farmers  is  given  in  Table  1.  We  make  a 
distinction between poplar and deciduous trees. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
2.2 Purchasing  policy of the Flemish Gov ernment 
Forest purchases within the next 40 years will take place within the framework of the 
LTRFP. The goals of this plan in terms of forest extension and the creation of new forests 
are  set  taking  into  account  the  current  forest  cover  and  several  criteria  such  as 
multifunctionality,  fragmentation,  urban  forests  and  biodiversity.  The  purchase  policy 
aims at extending the forest area in Flanders by an average of 625 ha per year until 2040. 
                                                     
4 See ABG (2003) for a detailed discussion of the subsidy schemes. 6
Forests are only purchased by the Flemish Government when a substantial surplus value is 
created. Also, purchasing of land currently used by economically sound farms is avoided.  
3. Modelling land use decisions  
First,  we  formally  describe  the  decision  process  of  landowners  and  government. 
Landowners  cultivate  their  land  so  that  their  private  income  is  maximised.  The 
government looks at the broader picture and maximises the total net benefit of land use. 
3.1 Land use decisions of landowners 
We assume that each plot of land is owned by one farmer and that land use decisions 
concern the plot as a whole. Landowners are assumed to be risk neutral. In order to clearly 
understand  the  landowners   reaction  to  specific  policies,  we  explicitly  model  their 
decision process (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Kaplan et al., 2004; 
Castagnini,  2004).  We  assume  that  landowners  choose  the  land  use    j
( 0 ; j foragriculture   1 ; j fora multifunctional forest   2 ) j for a poplar forest  
which maximises private net benefits   ij Y  from the land parcel i. This income can differ for 
each plot depending on its characteristics and its landowner, and it consists of the sum of 
expected  gross  income  from  agriculture   
a
ij Y ,  agricultural   
a
ij s   and  afforestation 
subsidies  
f
ij s , income from hunting   
h
ij Y  and timber   
t
ij Y , minus the manure disposal 
costs  
m
ij C , planting and management costs  
p
ij C  and taxes   ij t . Formally the objective 
function of the owner of plot i is: 
max
a a f h t m p
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij j Y Y s s Y Y C C t      (1) 
Landowners look at income after subsidies (e.g. EU agricultural subsidies) since this is 
what interests them. Flanders is a small open economy and as such does not influence 7
world  prices  of  agricultural  produce.  It  also  does  not  influence  the  level  of  the  EU 
subsidies. Both the government and the farmers can thus take the EU agricultural policy as 
given.  A  recent  overview  of  the  European  agri-environmental  policy  can  be  found  in 
Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge (2003). In section 5.1 we discuss the Flemish manure policy 
and the way we model fertilization decisions made by landowners. 
3.2 Land use decisions of the government 
The government wants to maximise the net social benefit accruing from land use in the 
region. Using a utilitarian approach (Sandmo, 2000), net social benefit consists of three 
terms: the income to landowners, the value of the land to society and the cost of financing 
the  chosen  policy.  The  regulator  chooses  the  optimal  land  use  for  each  plot,  i.e. 
  1 if landuse onplot ;else 0 ij x j i     is selected, in order to maximise 
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with
R
ij V  the recreation value of plot i under land use j,
E
ij V  the ecosystem value of plot i
under land use j,
NU
ij V  the non-use value of plot i under land use j, MCPF the marginal cost 
of public funds
5 and  i A  the surface area of plot i. Note that the Flemish government does 
not include agricultural subsidies into its objective function. We also do not consider the 
                                                     
5  The  marginal  cost  of  public  funds  ( MCPF)   measures  the  distortions  caused  by  the  collection  of  tax 
revenue. Each euro of collected taxes leads to a direct cost for the taxpayers (that one euro) as well as an 
indirect cost due to the less efficient functioning of the economy. The tax payments alter the consumption 
and labour decisions of the taxpayers and influence market behaviour. 8
issues  of  irreversibility  and  uncertainty  (Arrow  and  Fisher,  1974;  Dixit  and  Pindyck, 
1994) which might be relevant in an afforestation setting and which can create a quasi 
option value and add additional costs to afforestation. 
The government faces an area restriction: only combinations, which yield a wooded area 
of at least 150 and at most 200 hectares, are considered
6. The second restriction to the 
optimisation problem (2) specifies that each parcel of land can only have one type of use. 
The land use combination that maximizes total net social benefit given these restrictions is 
called the optimal location of forests in the remainder of the text. 
4. Methods 
We evaluate the Flemish afforestation policy and determine which changes can improve 
welfare. First, we have to select those forest sites that maximize net social benefits taking 
into account the decision behaviour of the landowners as described by equations (1) and 
(2). Next we choose some policy instruments that can yield this selection of sites.   
4.1 Selection of forest sites 
First we select those forest sites that all together maximize net social benefits (equation 
(2)) given a constraint on the total area of new forests. The methodology is described in 
detail in Moons et al. (forthcoming)
7 and follows a heuristic approach. Net social benefits 
                                                     
6 This area constraint is a proportional share of the overall Flemish objective of planting 10000 ha new 
forests according to the regional surface. 
7 The afforestation problem is a large combinatorial problem solved heuristically. A similar approach taking 
into account the proximity of population centers was introduced by Jørgensen et al. (1992) who solved the 
problem using simulated annealing. 9
subtract all costs from all benefits for all parties involved: landowners, government and 
society. 
Landowners  (equation  (1))  carry  the  costs  of  planting  and  management  of  the 
afforestation, manure disposal costs and taxes. They are entitled to the timber yield and 
the revenues of hunting permits in case of afforestation, to the agricultural yield of the 
land and agricultural or afforestation subsidies. The government (equation (2)) bears the 
costs of afforestation subsidies as well as the marginal cost of public funds caused by 
collecting taxes. Society as a whole benefits from afforestation due to recreation, carbon 
sequestration, other ecological and non-use values created by new forests over and above 
these values that can be attributed to agriculture. 
In the application, we assume that all marginal costs, except for manure disposal costs, are 
constant  and  all  costs  are  additive.  Moreover,  we  assume  that  all  benefits,  except 
recreation  values,  of  multifunctional  forests  have  constant  marginal  values  and  are 
additive. For non-constant marginal costs and benefits (per hectare and year) there is a 
geographical interaction between sites. For example, two forests that are located closely 
together are substitutes since potential visitors will choose between the two. 
Recreation benefits of multifunctional forests are highly dependent on the location of the 
forest, on the location of its substitute forest sites, which can be both existing and other 
new forests, and on the regional population density. To estimate recreation benefits of 
non-existing  forest  sites,  we  transfer  a  zonal  recreation  demand  function  that  was 
estimated for one base site, i.e. Heverleebos-Meerdaalwoud (HB-MW). This is up until 
now the only forest for which a recreation valuation study has been conducted in Flanders 
(Moons et al., 2000). A zonal recreation demand function, or travel cost model, predicts 
visit rates in view of the cost of a visit (primarily travel costs), socio-demographic data of 
potential  visitors  and  surroundings  of  the  site  (age,  education,  professional  activity, 10
population density) and the availability and characteristics of other forest sites a person 
might visit (the so-called substitutes). The recreation demand function of HB-MW equals 
(Moons et al., 2000): 
251 3.4 0.024 1.16 774 55
plus Visitrate travelcost popden sub index prop  
The visit rate (i.e. the ratio of total visits to the total population) is explained in function of 
the  (two-way)  travel  cost,  the  population  density  within  the  origin  zone  (popden),  a 
substitution  index  (sub index)  which  measures  the  total  area  of  substitutes  and  the 
proportion of people older than 55 years per origin zone (prop5 5
plus). Next, we transfer the 
estimated recreation demand function for HB-MW to each of the ten new forest sites in 
our study region. This gives us an estimate of the number of yearly visits to the new forest 
site. Further, we calculate the consumer surplus per visit and total recreational value of 
each forest site. A site may have a different recreation value in the different sets it belongs 
to due to the varying number of substitutes (Moons et al., forthcoming). 
4.2 Choice of policy instruments 
Having established the optimal location of new forests, the regulator needs to implement a 
policy  and  select  the  most  cost  effective  instrument  that  will  yield  this  optimal 
combination of forests. The simplest solution, which is the command-and-control or CAC 
solution, consists of telling the landowners of the optimal sites to plant forests or face 
severe penalties. However, this is not a realistic option in a democracy and, for this reason, 
we examine several other policy options
8. Also, a scenario including expropriation is very 
unlikely due to the high political costs and will, therefore, be excluded from our case 
study. We consecutively discuss five possible policies for afforestation in Flanders. 
                                                     
8 Since private forestry in Flanders is dominated by small-scale planters, we do not consider tax exemptions 
as a policy option. 11
Option 1: purchasing policy at mark et prices 
More realistically, we can assume that whenever pieces of land specified in the optimal 
location are put up for sale, the government buys them. This can be realised by a system 
including  rights  of  first  purchase.  A  right  of  first  purchase  implies  that  the  Flemish 
government can buy parcels, which are put up for sale, instead of the highest bidder at the 
price and conditions specified by this potential buyer. This only happens on condition that 
there are no other rights of first purchase since tenants or land consolidation committees 
always have priority. Notarys offices are obliged to give the Flemish government the 
opportunity to employ its right of first purchase.  
To obtain the optimal location of forests, the government should only buy land that is part 
of the optimal combination. This implies that the government needs to wait until these 
parcels are put up for sale. In our application, we assume that each period parcel i is put on 
the market with an exogenous probability pi. This probability is determined, among other 
things, by the farmers need for cash, by retirements or inheritances and also by the farms 
income  relative  to  the  offered  price.  In  the  first  period,  the  government  has  thus  a 
probability of  i
i OPT
p
   of acquiring the optimal location for the forest expansion; with OPT
the set of all parcels belonging to the optimal combination. Obviously, it can take a very 
long time to optimally create forests using this instrument. It is also a rather expensive 
way of acquiring the desired forests since the government pays market prices. Moreover, 
the government becomes owner of the lands and needs to manage and maintain them.
Option 2: Subsidies for specific locations 
Can the government decide to only subsidise forests planted at the optimal locations?  
Subsidies are only legally binding when written down in a law, which determines the 
necessary requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to apply for the subsidy. These 12
conditions need to be objective criteria
9 and citizens who meet them cannot be excluded 
arbitrarily (discrimination principle). It is, nonetheless, possible to specify a total budget 
and work on a  first come, first serve basis. It is, therefore, not legally possible to only 
subsidise the owner of parcel X on an individual basis and not the owner of parcel Y.  








  (3) 
with
agr
i Y net income if the land is used for agriculture   0 0 0 0
agr a a h m
i i i i i Y Y s Y C    and 
for
ij Y
net income if a forest is planted  
for h t m p
ij ij ij ij ij Y Y Y C C  
10. This optimal subsidy policy 
cannot be specified as such since  belonging to the optimal combination is not a general 
and objective criterion. The government can, however, specify the criteria for afforestation 
subsidies with the view of matching the optimal location as closely as possible. For this 
reason, it is interesting to look closely at the factors (population density, soil conditions, 
type of farm ) determining the optimal location.  
McCarthy et al. (2003) note that upfront payments paid in the early years of planting may 
be both a persuasive and cost efficient method of increasing the level of private forestry 
planting. This is because the planter receives the payments immediately and they do not 
suffer from any risk of changes in government policy or from devaluation due to inflation. 
Option 3: Subsidy scheme combined with purchases 
Mimicking the current policy in Flanders, the government could also decide to combine 
the  subsidy scheme  for  specific  locations with  a purchasing  policy. This  provides  the 
                                                     
9 The criteria used to allocate the subsidies need to be effective, i.e. they need to promote the goal of the 
subsidy policy. They also need to be general, i.e. not specifically tailored for one case.  
10 We assume that the agricultural income from grazers and pigs is fixed throughout the whole exercise. 13
option  to  buy  certain  parcels  of  land  and  convert  them  into  forests,  if  the  current 
landowners are unwilling to use the subsidies provided. 
Option 4: Subsidy and tax scheme 
The  Flemish  government  can  also  combine  subsidies  with  taxes.  They  can  provide  a 
subsidy to the farmer who decides to plant a forest. If, on the other hand, the land is used 
for agriculture, then the farmer has to pay a tax proportional to the number of hectares that 
were not forested. The conditions for the subsidy can depend on various factors such as 
the distance to existing forests or the soil type. Using this policy would reduce the costs to 
the government substantially because it also creates tax revenues.  
Formally we have, on the one hand, if the farmer decides not to plant a forest, a tax  0 i t  to 
be paid. On the other hand, if a forest is planted, a subsidy 
f
ij s  for  ^ ` 1,2 j  is granted. We 
also  assume  that  1 2 0 0
f
i i i t t s     .  The  following  conditions  must  hold  to  obtain  the 




i i ij ij
agr for f
i i ij ij
Y t Y s if i OPT
Y t Y s if i OPT
d
!
  (4) 
A possible solution for the tax and subsidy rate is for  ^ ` 1,2 j :
  0 1 2 max ,
0 0
f agr for agr for for
ij i ij i i i i s Y Y if i OPT and t Y Y Y if i OPT
if i OPT if i OPT
t
  
  (5) 
It  is  only  possible  to  obtain  these  tax  and  subsidy  rates  if  the  optimal  parcels  are 
distinguishable from non-optimal parcels using objective criteria (see also Option 2).
Option 5 : Auctions 
Auctions are a method frequently used in procuring commodities for which there are no 
well-established  markets.  They  are  of  particular  interest  for  conservation  contracting 
(Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997), since the traded item, the provision of 14
environmental benefits, is a public-type non-market good which has no standard value. 
Auctions also enable the participants to deal with uncertainty about the object being sold.  
In a discriminatory first-price sealed-bid auction farmers can ask the amount of subsidies 
(= bid) they would like to receive for converting their farmland into forest. This implies 
that the n lowest bidders are rewarded and receive the payment stated in their bids. The 
regulator will need to set a maximal acceptable bid to induce farmers to reveal their bids 
truthfully  (Myerson,  1981).  After  all  bids  are  made,  the  regulator  will  calculate  the 
optimal cluster of new forests and accept the bids of all landowners that belong to the 
optimal  combination.  The  farmers  do  not  know  in  advance  the  outcome  of  this 
optimisation exercise and assume that the probability distribution of winning the auction is 
equal for all participants. Calculating the optimal location of new forests implies that the 
government  knows  the  costs  and  benefits  of  forestry  and  agriculture  for  the  different 
farmers.  Landowners,  who  ask  more  subsidies  than  necessary  to  cover  the  costs  of 
conversion, will have a zero probability of having their bid accepted. Since it is irrational 
to bid less than the land conversion costs, farmers will in equilibrium bid precisely enough 
to cover their costs (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997):  
agr for
i i i b Y Y     (6) 
These bids allow the government to reach the optimal combination of forests at lower cost 
than through subsidies.  
5. Data  
The study area in this paper is Wetteren-Aalst, a suburban region in East Flanders. Ten 
agricultural  sites  are  marked  as  potential  locations  for  new  forests.  For  reasons  of 15
simplicity, we assume that the ten sites are each owned by one single farmer
11 and that 
decisions on land use  change  apply to the site in its entirety. The farmer  might  have 
farmland on other locations or might have cowsheds, sties or folds that are not affected by 
the afforestation of the farmland in our dataset. For more site information see Appendix 1. 
We rely on GIS (geographical information systems) for data collection and input. This is 
the case for the selection of the new forest sites, the distances between sites, the manure 
disposal and socio-economic characteristics. Other data are derived (or transferred) from 
relevant Flemish studies or databases where possible.  
Each selected site is either planted with poplar (with a rotation cycle
12 of 25 years) or is 
laid out as a sustainable  managed multifunctional forest (with a rotation cycle of 150 
years). In the reference scenario all parcels are put to an agricultural use. All costs and 
benefits for all parties  landowners, society and government - and for all three types of 
land use are calculated as annuities over a period of 150 years, the chosen rotation cycle 
(Garcia Quijano et al., 2005). All figures are in EURO 2000 and we use a discount rate of 
2.5%.
5.1 Setting 
In line with policy objectives, 150-200 ha of new forestland is allocated to the region 
Wetteren-Aalst. All subsets of ten sites within the region that meet this area constraint are 
compared with respect to their net social benefits. Over 24000 subsets of at least 2 and at 
most 7 sites (each site can be either poplar or multifunctional forests) meet the constraint. 
As all new forests will be planted on agricultural land, net social benefits of forests need to 
be compared with the value of the current agricultural use of the land. Three branches of 
                                                     
11 This is reasonable since the average farm size in East Flanders is approx. 30-40 ha. 
12 We assume a constant rotation cycle. However, recent literature suggests that the optimal rotation cycle 
can be influenced by afforestation policies (Tassone et al., 2004). 16
agriculture are present in our dataset: crop farms, crop combined with pig farms, and crop 
combined with grazer (excl. dairy cows) farms. For ease of exposition, we use the terms 
pig farms and grazer farms for the last two categories. Net income differs substantially 
according to the branch of agriculture a site currently belongs to
13. Crop farms create the 
highest yearly net income (647 Euro/ha), followed by pigs (549 Euro/ha) and grazers (473 
Euro/ha). The net private income includes agricultural subsidies and excludes taxes. Other 
costs  include  implicit  wages  for  the  farmer,  wages  paid  to  third  parties,  machinery 
depreciation, maintenance, purchased and self-produced feed, seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, 
capital costs (CVL, 2000) 
Excessive manure production is a serious environmental problem in a densely populated 
area such as Flanders. Use of the soil for agricultural production allows limited spread of 
manure on the agricultural land
14. Manure standards have become more stringent over the 
last  decades.  Emission  limits  for  nitrogen  and  phosphate  differ  per  parcel  of  land  in 
function of soil type and type of crop, as well as protection laws for area and ground 
water. The measures included in current Flemish manure policy can be divided into three 
categories: measures aiming at the source of the problem, instruments to improve fertilizer 
use and finally manure processing and export (Vervaet et al., 2004).  
The manner in which the farmers dispose of the manure produced is therefore important. 
We assume that grazer farms are able to spread their manure on their own land. Their 
manure deposition costs are therefore assumed to be zero. Crop farms do not produce any 
manure (appendix 1). Pig farms, in contrast, cannot spread all produced manure on their 
own land. We assume that they have an agreement with crop farms to spread their excess 
manure on cropland. The cost associated with spreading fertilizer on cropland equals the 
                                                     
13 See Centrum voor Landbouweconomie (2001). 
14 On average 27 tonnes can be spread on one hectare of agricultural land in East Flanders. 17
transportation cost and we assume that the cost of one trip by tractor of 10 tonne manure 
equals 12 Euro
15.
We assume that, when the farmland is afforested, farmers lose all their agricultural income 
from that piece of land. As other parcels of farmland or stables owned by the farmer are 
unaffected, part of the farmers income will be preserved. Manure produced by grazers 
and pigs is spread on remaining agricultural land or disposed of in an alternative way, both 
of which are costly. If farmers are no longer able to spread their manure on land due to 
afforestation,  the  cost  of  industrial  processing  equals  12  Euro/tonne.  Including  the 
processing  of  manure into the  model, implies that the farmers afforestation decisions 
cannot be examined independently of each other. If crop farmers decide to plant trees on 
their land, there will be less land available for spreading the pig manure and pig farmers 
will have to dispose of their manure in another, more costly, way. Since crop farmers do 
not consider this externality when deciding on land use, their decisions are not always 
socially optimal.  
If the site is afforested, a farmers income will depend highly on which other sites are 
afforested due to the change in available land for spreading manure. It might even become 
negative once more expensive industrial processing of manure is necessary. The lowest 
(highest) net private farmers income is -4738 (544) Euro per hectare and year for a pig 
farm, -1259 (473) for a grazer farm and -364 (647) for a crop farm. The net income per 
hectare of land of a crop farmer is constant as he does not have any manure to dispose of 
and is thus independent of the afforestation decisions of other sites. 
Besides agricultural products, agrarian land produces benefits such as recreation, hunting, 
carbon  sequestration,  non-use  and  ecological  values.  Hunting  values  for  agrarian  land 
                                                     
15 We assume that the fuel use of a tractor is 0.5 liter per km (Rathwell et al., 2000), that the price of diesel is 
0.3 Euro/l, that the other costs equal 1.05 Euro/l (Rathwell et al., 2000) and that the average trip is 10 km.   18
amount to 8 Euro per ha and year (Moons et al., 2000). Carbon uptake was simulated for 
agricultural land by Garcia Quijano et al. (2005). As agriculture serves as the benchmark 
land use, we assume a zero value for carbon sequestration. For data on recreation, non-use 
and ecological values of agrarian land, very few sources are available. We use data from a 
Swedish contingent valuation study from 1992 (Drake, 1992). He studies open and varied 
agrarian  landscapes  and  finds  an  annual  value  of  193  Euro  per  hectare  and  year  for 
recreation, non-use and ecological values combined
16.
Depending on the afforestation policy scheme, the farmer either receives a subsidy for 
afforesting the land himself or he sells it to the government. We assume that the price for a 
hectare of farmland in East Flanders is 25000 Euro
17. In the latter case, the government is 
responsible for all costs and entitled to all future yields, in the former case both costs and 
yields accrue to the farmer who is still the landowner. 
5.2 Alternative land uses 
We discuss two types of land use: poplar and sustainable multifunctional forests.   
5.2.1 Poplar forests 
A site is planted with the best available poplar clones and managed according to the best 
available management scheme (see also Garcia Quijano et al., 2005). We assume a 25-
year rotation cycle. For reasons of comparability, we assume six consecutive rotations 
with a total duration of 150 years.  
Timber yields depend on the type of soil and on average amount to 202 Euro per ha and 
year (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005). Other types of benefits produced by poplar forests 
                                                     
16 Annuity, Euro 2000. 
17 This is the average of ten parcels of farmland put up for sale on the largest Belgian real estate website 
www.immoweb.be. We use the annuity of this value over 25 years at 2.5 %, i.e. 1357 Euro/ha. 19
include hunting (8 Euro per ha and year) (Moons et al., 2000), recreation, non-use and 
ecological values (320 Euro per ha and year) (Drake et al., 1992). The value per tonne of 
carbon sequestered is estimated at 10 Euro (CIEMAT, 1999). For a total of approximately 
29 tonne of carbon sequestered per hectare (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005) compared to 0 
tonne of carbon uptake in the benchmark (agricultural land use), this amounts to 292 Euro 
per ha and year. Planting and management costs accrue to 99 Euro per ha and year (Garcia 
Quijano et al., 2005).  
5.2.2 Sustainable multifunctional forest 
A  sustainably  managed  multifunctional  forest  is  a  forest  where  wood  production  is 
combined with high ecological and recreational values, characterized by long rotations 
(i.e. 150 years), managed with a thinning frequency of 10 years and regenerated with a 
group selection system (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005).  We assume a former agricultural 
site is planted with a mixed oak-beech forest, both native tree types. Thinnings begin at 
age 40 with a frequency of 10 years. Final harvesting takes place in the year 150. Timber 
yields as well as the sale of (small game) hunting permits are benefits accruing to the 
landowner.  Other  non-tangible  benefits  include  carbon  sequestration,  other  ecological 
values, non-use values and recreation.   
Timber yield accrues to 5 Euro per ha and year on average (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005). 
These values are much lower than for poplar plantings as harvesting takes place at a later 
point in time. Hunting values for multifunctional forests are twice the value for poplar 
plantings (15 Euro per ha and year; Moons et al., 2000). Carbon sequestration values 
amount to 69 Euro per ha and year (or 6.88 tonnes of carbon valued at 10 Euro/tonne; 
Garcia Quijano et al., 2005 and CIEMAT, 1999), other ecological values amount to 52 
Euro per ha and year (Garrod and Willis, 1997) and non-use values are estimated at 3860 20
Euro per ha and year (Moons et al., 2006). The average
18 recreation value for each of our 
ten study sites varies from 314 to 2268 Euro per ha and year. 
Planting  and  management  costs  are  assumed  to  be  24  Euro  per  ha  and  year  (Garcia 
Quijano et al., 2005). This number is quite high compared to timber yield and can be 
explained by the difference in timing of these costs and benefits. Costs are high at the 
beginning of a rotation cycle, benefits are high at the end of a rotation. 
6. Results and discussion 
In reality the implementation of the Flemish forest policy happens at a very slow pace and 
the policy targets are not being met in time (NARA, 2005). One possible explanation can 
be found in Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997). These authors state that 
farmers in the EU have proved to be reluctant to participate in conservation programs, 
such as afforestation programs, because they fear that the government will not allow them 
to alter the management changes after the contracts have expired. In reality, there are also 
considerable transaction costs associated with the current afforestation policy and this can 
deter farmers from participating in the program.  
6.1 Selection of new forests 
Applying the methodology explained in section 4.1 combined with the data from section 
5, we find that the optimal combination of new forests consists of sites 1, 2, 9 and 10. 
Sites 1, 9 and 10 are currently used for crop farming whereas site 2 is used for grazing. 
Despite  the  manure  externality  imposed  by  the  afforestation  of  crop  lands,  it  is  still 
optimal to do so since the loss in manure deposition possibilities (2351 ton) is relatively 
small  compared  to  the  total  manure  production  (34142  ton)  of  the  animal  farms  (see 
                                                     
18 Average over all combinations a particular site belongs to. 21
appendix 1). Moreover, the average recreation value of each of the four optimal sites is 
higher than the average recreation value over all sites (i.e. 1290  /ha). Site 2 is the largest 
in terms of surface area (64 ha), while site 9 measures only 22 ha. Population density 
around sites 1 and 2 is higher than the average for Flanders, sites 9 and 10 are situated in 
far less densely populated areas. For more information on these sites see Appendix 1. 
Similar to Termansen et al. (2004), we find that the location of sites relative to existing 
and other new sites as well as to major population centers is crucial. 
6.2 Comparison of policy options 
First we look at the differences in social welfare between the current subsidy policy and 
the  optimal  command-and-control  (CAC)  policy.  This  command-and-control policy 
implies that the government orders the farmers belonging to the optimal combination to 
plant multifunctional forests on their plots and the farmers fully comply. The farmers still 
own the land and bear all planting and management costs. Secondly, we consider several 
policy options to implement the optimal combination of forests. Finally, we investigate 
what happens if transfers between agents are no longer costless. 
6.2.1 Current subsidy policy versus optimal CAC policy 
First we apply the current Flemish subsidy scheme to our benchmark and observe which 
farmers will participate. For the specified subsidy amounts farmers 1, 9 and 10 decide to 
plant  forests.  The  current  subsidy  scheme  (see  equation  (2)  with  1 765/
f
i s ha   ,
2 395/
f
i s ha    and  0 0
f
i ij s t    ) increases social welfare with 838 969 Euro compared to 
not having a Flemish afforestation policy. The optimal policy    0
f
ij ij withs t    , which 
ensures that the new cluster of forests is planted at its optimal location, increases this level 22
of social welfare by another 195 983 Euro, i.e. 23 percent. This implies that the current 
afforestation policy in Flanders is not optimal and that there is room for improvement. 
In  order  to  identify  the  possibilities  for  policy  reform,  we  investigate  the  differences 
between current subsidy and optimal CAC policy in table 2. The current subsidy amount, 
if we model the landowners behaviour as in equation (1), induces only three (out of ten) 
farmers to plant forests while the optimal policy involves four landowners. Surprisingly 
the  optimal  location  of  forests  has  a  slightly  lower  recreational  value  to  Flemish 
consumers  than  the  present  policy.  However,  the  increase  in  non-use,  ecological  and 
carbon  sequestration  benefits  compensates  for  the  loss  in  recreational  value  under  the 
optimal policy. It is never socially optimal to plant poplar since these forests have only a 
limited advantage over agriculture and have higher associated costs. The advantages of 
poplar plantings, however, may increase once their potential for substituting fossil fuel as 
a source for electricity production is fully acknowledged and their value as carbon sinks 
increases. 
6.2.2 Implementing the optimal combination 
As we mentioned in section 4.2 it is not politically feasible in Flanders to dictate to the 
landowners of the optimal parcels to plant forests. In order to obtain the optimal cluster of 
forests,  we  need  regulation  that  respects  the  Belgian  constitution  and  international 
agreements.  To  this  end,  we  look  at  the  different  policy  options  that  were  previously 
discussed in section 3.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 First we discuss the optimal purchasing policy. In the empirical exercise we chose the 
probabilities pi ad hoc and the probability that the optimal combination of plots is acquired 23
by the Flemish government is zero for our example since we assume that parcel 10 is 
never put up for sale (appendix 1).  
The second policy option looks at subsidies for specific locations. In our illustration, the 
subsidy for optimal parcels is 911 Euro/ha of multifunctional forest for crop farms and for 
farms with grazers. This subsidy scheme induces all crop farmers (farmers 1, 9 and 10) to 
plant a forest, while only one grazer farmer (farmer 2) does so    2 2 21
agr for f Y Y s d . The 
other two grazer farmers (farmers 4 and 8) do not use the subsidy since they have more 
manure to dispose of   4/8 4/8 4/8,1
agr for f Y Y s ! . The optimal subsidy is almost 20 percent more 
than the current annualised subsidy of 765 Euro/ha (see table 1).  
In  the  third  policy  option,  we  assume  that  the  optimal  subsidies  from  option  2  are 
complemented with a right of first purchase. We include this option in order to mimic the 
current  afforestation  policy,  which  includes  both  subsidies  and  purchases.  Given  our 
assumptions, purchasing the land is more expensive for the government than subsidizing 
afforestation projects. For this reason, the government will only buy the necessary land if 
the farmer does not participate in the subsidy program. 
The fourth option was the revenue-neutral subsidy-tax scheme. If we combine the optimal 
subsidy from option 2 with a revenue-neutral tax (or a reduction in subsidies) for farmers 
who favour agriculture, six landowners (1, 2, 4, 8, 9 and 10) would plant forests. This 
policy specification would, however, not satisfy our area constraint. The resulting forests 
would cover 243 ha (> 200 ha). Therefore, we opt to offer a subsidy of 658 Euro/ha to crop 
farmers and a revenue-neutral tax of 225 Euro/ha for agricultural land users. This leads to 
the creation of three forests on land parcels 1, 9 and 10. Note that through this scenario we 
are able to replicate the (theoretical) result obtained by the current subsidy level, but at 
lower  cost  to  the  government.  We  are  unable  to  find  an  objective  criterion  to  induce 
farmer 2 to cease farming while at the same time convincing farmers 4 and 8 to continue 24
with agriculture. It appears to be impossible to optimally locate the new forests using this 
policy option and this will lower net social benefits (see figure 1). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Finally, the auction scheme induces farmers to exactly ask the amount of subsidies that 
would allow them to cover their conversion costs of switching from agriculture to forestry. 
The government can thus reach the optimal combination at a lower cost than through a 
subsidy scheme. After all, the subsidy needs to be set at the conversion level of the highest 
cost  farmer  in  the  optimal  combination      max
f agr for
i i i OPT s Y Y
     while  an    optimally 
designed    auction  scheme  pays  each  farmer  exactly  his  or  her  conversion  rate 
 
agr for
i i i b Y Y for all i OPT   .
6.3 Costly transfers 
We were able to obtain the same level of social welfare with the policy options 2, 3 and 5 
as the optimal CAC policy (see figure 1). The underlying reason is that subsidies and taxes 
are treated as costless transfers between different agents. We assume that the government 
can collect funds at zero cost, i.e. the marginal cost of public funds equals one. Obviously, 
when we relax this assumption and assume a  marginal cost of public funds of 1.5, it 
becomes important how much a policy costs for the government. Policies that are costless 
or even raise revenues are preferable to more costly options. This implies that option 4, the 
subsidy-tax scheme, becomes more advantageous since it is designed as a revenue-neutral 
policy. However, if the government does not want to tax farmers and since the CAC 
policy is politically infeasible, the auction policy is the best option. If the auction can be 
optimally designed, it can substantially decrease government expenditures and increase 
welfare compared to subsidy or purchasing schemes. 25
7. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
Before  deciding  on  the  afforestation  policy,  it  is  welfare  improving  to  calculate  the 
optimal  location  of  new  forests.  The  analysis  of  the  optimal  location  can  provide  the 
regulator  with  objective  criteria,  which  can  be  used  to  implement  an  optimal  policy. 
Currently, the Flemish government supposedly only buys land for forest expansion when a 
substantial surplus value is expected. However, an objective and clear definition of this 
substantial surplus value has not been incorporated in existing legislation. Our empirical 
illustration  shows  that  the  welfare  gain  is  considerable  if  the  afforestation  subsidy  is 
conditioned on an objective criterion rather than a case-by-case approach. 
The  calculation  of  the  optimal  location  of  a  cluster  of  forests  rather  than  locating 
individual  forests  separately  is  essential  when  externalities  and  interdependencies  are 
present. Recreation benefits, for example, differ according to the number of substitutes 
available and depend on the location of all newly planted forests. The problem of manure 
deposition can also lead to negative externalities when farmland is used to spread manure 
of other farmers. The interactions between existing forests, new forests and agriculture 
need  to  be  considered  in  order  to  correctly  calculate  the  net  social  benefit  of  the 
afforestation policy. 
The current subsidy scheme stipulates a minimal area constraint of 0.5 ha. Since recreation 
seems to be a driving force in the Flemish afforestation policy and given its crucial role in 
selecting  multiple  forest  combinations,  forests  should  have  a  minimal  area  surface  of 
several hectares. The recreation value as well as the ecological value of forests increases 
dramatically once a threshold of several hectares (20 ha) is crossed. Keeping this in mind, 
planting  uniform  poplar  forests  is  less  interesting  by  far  than  more  complex  forest 
structures. When designing a subsidy policy, the regulator should take the asymmetric 
timing of costs and benefits into account. The largest part of the cost burden falls at the 26
beginning of the forest rotation whereas benefits only start to accrue after several years. 
The problem of the cost burden can be mitigated by upfront payments of subsidies. To 
fully capture the benefits, the current planning horizon of 25 years (for a broad leave 
forest) is rather short. The political planning horizon is likely to be even shorter since the 
time remaining until the next elections is of critical importance to most politicians. Ideally, 
the government should consider the whole rotation cycle (of 150 years for a deciduous 
forest).
It also seems worthwhile to consider auctions for afforestation contracts. This instrument 
has  not  been  previously  used  in  Flanders  but  it  has  proven  its  worth  in  the  US 
Conservation Reserve Program (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997). 27
Appendix 1:  Main characteristics of the potential forest sites  
  Site 
 Number 













( 15 km z one 
around land parcel)
Number of substitute forests 
within _ km distance 
( surface area between brackets)  
Current Land Use: 
Agricultural Branch  
            2  2- 5  5- 10   10 - 15   
1 47  19,60 0 0.1  476.47  1 (70)  0  3 (648)  5 (799)  Crop farm 
2 64  3 4,30 2 195 0.2  504.82  1 (60)  0  5 (949)  3 (498)  Grazer farm 
(excl. dairy cows) 
3 101  4 8,91 5 379 0.01  511.32  0  1 (179)  0  3 (312)  Pig farm 
4 35  3 5,29 1235 0.05  226.21  0  3 (143)  3 (188)  2 (535)  Grazer farm 
(excl. dairy cows) 
5 27  3 02 ,30 8 887 0.03  416.43  0  2 (107)  6 (724)  4 (130)  Pig farm 
6 48  156,88 8 199 0.15  314.00  0  5 (325)  2 (145)  2 (469)  Pig farm 
7 44  133 ,48 6395 0.02  246.52  0  4 (212)  2 (120)  1 (119)  Pig farm 
8 26  7 1,23 1852 0.1  340.70  0  3 (179)  4 (282)  5 (781)  Grazer farm  
(excl. dairy cows) 
9 22  4 5,73 0 0.5  154.97  0  2 (137)  3 (175)  1 (62)  Crop farm 
10   49  8,7 3 0 0  263.66  0  3 (175)  3 (157)  1 (119)  Crop farm 28
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Tables
Table 1: Subsidies for afforestation of farmland ( Euro per ha and per year unless 
mentioned otherwise) 








500  500  
Planting:  
border (bushes or 
deciduous trees) 
100 per100m  100 per 100m 
Maintenance 1100  1750 
Supplement 1:  
land in forest or 
forest extension area 
(according to LSP) 




250  250 
Income 
compensation 
375 for 5 years  500 for 20 years for 
native tree species, 
375 for 5 years 
otherwise 
                                                     
19 Wallnut, false Acacia, American Oak, sweet Chestnut. 
20 Summer Oak, Winter Oak; for other native deciduous tree species one receives 2000, 2500 or 3000 /ha. 
For a complete list see Afdeling Bos en Groen (2003). 33
Table 2: Comparison between current subsidy and optimal CAC policy 
  Current subsidy policy  Optimal CAC policy 
Forested area (in ha)  118  182 
Number of forests  3  
(1, 9 and 10) 
4
(1,2,9 and 10) 
Type of forests  Multifunctional  Multifunctional 
Net farmers income (euro)   -13 716   -162 209 
Government revenue (euro)  -90 266  0 
Net recreational value (euro)  473 221  472 663 
Net  non-use  value  +   net  ecological 
value +  net carbon sequestration (euro) 
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